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Abstract—This paper studies a new secrecy beamforming (SBF)
scheme for multiple-input single-output non-orthogonal multiple
access (MISO-NOMA) systems. In particular, the proposed SBF
scheme efficiently exploits artificial noise to protect the confidential
information of two NOMA assisted legitimate users, such that only
the eavesdropper’s channel is degraded. Considering a practical
assumption of the imperfect worst-case successive interference
cancellation which is a unique character in employing NOMA
transmission, we derive a closed-form expression for the secrecy
outage probability to characterize the secrecy performance. After
that, we carry out an analysis of secrecy diversity order to
provide further insights about secure MISO-NOMA transmission.
Numerical results are provided to demonstrate the accuracy of the
developed analytical results and the effectiveness of the proposed
SBF scheme.
Index Terms—Non-orthogonal multiple access, multiple-input
single-output, physical layer security, artificial noise.
I. INTRODUCTION
Non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA), which efficiently
exploits power domain multiplexing at transmitter(s) and succes-
sive interference cancellation (SIC) at receiver(s) to serve multi-
ple users in the same resource block (e.g., time/frequency/code
domain), has shown its promising potential to improve wireless
spectrum efficiency [1]–[4]. Owing to the broadcast nature of
radio frequency communications, the confidential information is
vulnerable to passive eavesdropping, and thus, guaranteeing se-
cure NOMA transmission by enlisting the help of physical layer
security technique has attracted enormous research attention (see,
e.g., [5]–[10] and references therein).
It is known that better secrecy can be achieved with the
aid of artificial noise (AN) masking in conventional multiple-
input single-output orthogonal multiple access (MISO-OMA)
systems [11]–[13]. This concept has been applied in MISO-
NOMA systems, where two precoding matrices are designed
to secure two NOMA assisted legitimate users (LUs) against
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a passive eavesdropper (Eve) [5]. However, directly employing
conventional AN-aided scheme to secure MISO-NOMA trans-
mission has the following limitations:
• The NOMA assisted LUs are severely subjected to inter-
ference, and thus the secrecy beamforming (SBF) scheme
in [5] inevitably causes the situation that AN leaks into
the range space of the NOMA assisted LUs, which yields
more interference and leads to a poor reception quality at
the NOMA assisted LUs.
• The individual precoding matrix exclusively increases the
signal strength for its intended LU, indicating that the weak
LU’s signal strength becomes worse than that of the strong
LU at the time of NOMA signal detection. This may cause
an unsuccessful SIC processing, which further results in
both transmission outage and secrecy outage.
On this basis, the conventional AN-aided scheme for MISO-
OMA systems should be carefully modified to be applicable
for secure MISO-NOMA transmission. To overcome the afore-
mentioned limitations, we propose a new SBF scheme which
efficiently exploits AN for security enhancement of MISO-
NOMA tarnsmission. The main contributions of this paper are
summarized as follows.
• To guarantee secure MISO-NOMA transmission, we de-
velop a new SBF scheme by exploiting AN. Particularly,
AN is generated such that it lies in the null space of the
main channel and no AN leaks into the range space of
LUs, yielding an acceptable reception quality. Furthermore,
the proposed beamforming matrix artificially creates the
difference between LUs’ channel gains, thus the potential
of NOMA can be fully realized even if the two LUs have
the same channel statistics.
• The secrecy outage performance of the proposed SBF
scheme is analyzed by considering the imperfect worst-
case SIC assumption, which is found to be highly realistic
for scenarios of practical interest. Note that the imperfect
worst-case SIC may induce either a transmission outage
or a secrecy outage at the NOMA assisted LUs, which
is an essential characteristic in analyzing secure NOMA
communications. This makes the secrecy outage analysis
of our proposed SBF scheme being different from that in
[5], where an optimistic assumption of the perfect SIC at
the NOMA assisted LUs has been adopted.
• We theoretically derive closed-form expression of the se-
crecy outage probability (SOP) for each LU, and validate
its accuracy by computer simulations. In order to provide
further insights, we also carry out an analysis of secrecy
diversity order. Numerical results show that an improved
secrecy outage performance for MISO-NOMA systems can
be achieved by our proposed SBF scheme.
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II. SYSTEM MODEL AND SCHEME DESCRIPTION
A. Channel Model
Consider a downlink secure MISO-NOMA scenario, where the
confidential communication between a M -antenna base station
(BS) and two NOMA assisted single-antenna LUs (e.g., LU1
and LU2) is overheard by a N -antenna Eve.1 We assume that
M > N , because otherwise the Eve can eliminate AN and
cannot support perfect secrecy communication [11], [13]. The
channels in the system experience quasi-static fading, e.g., the
channel gains remain unchanged during one fading block but
vary independently among different fading blocks. The length
of a fading block is one time unit. Consider one fading block,
the 1 × M channel vector between BS and LUk is denoted
by hk for k = 1, 2, and the N ×M channel matrix between
BS and Eve is denoted by He. The entries of hk and He
are modeled as independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
complex Gaussian variables with mean being zero and variance
being unit. In this work, we focus on the scenario without path
loss, and thus, the channel gains of the two LUs have the same
statistics, which yields a challenging situation to exploit the
potential of NOMA.2 Similar to [5], [11]–[13], we consider a
practical passive eavesdropping scenario which means that the
Eve only listens but does not transmit, therefore the instantaneous
knowledge of He is not available at Eve. While hk can be
precisely estimated by LUk and fed back to BS and Eve over an
authenticated broadcast channel. The noises corrupted by LUs
and Eve are modeled as the additive white Gaussian noises
(AWGNs) with mean being zero and variances being σ2b and
σ2e , respectively.
Notations: Throughout the paper, the following notations will
be used: [·]T denotes the matrix transpose operation, [·]† denotes
the complex conjugate transpose operation, diag[·] denotes the
diagonal matrix, In denotes the n×n identity matrix, E[·] denotes
the expectation operation, || · || denotes the norm of a vector,
| · | denotes the determinant of a matrix, and (·)−1 denotes the
inverse.
B. Proposed SBF Scheme
To guarantee secure MISO-NOMA transmission, a new SBF
scheme which efficiently exploits AN is proposed to protect the
confidential information. Specifically, we design an M×(M−1)
beamforming matrix W = [w1,W2], where w1 is used to
transmit information-bearing signals and W2 is used to transmit
AN. The design of W2 is to intentionally degrade the Eve’s
channel quality by transmitting AN isotropically except toward
the LUs. The construction of W2 is based on the information
of the 2 × M main channel matrix Hm = [h1,h2]T , which








corresponding to its (M−2) non-zero eigenvalues
due to the fact that the rank of the orthogonal projection matrix
1The two-user form of NOMA is one most typical NOMA scenario in the
literature [2]–[8], and is recommended to be used in practical systems, such
as multi-user superposition transmission (MUST) in 3rd-generation partnership
project long-term evolution (3GPP-LTE). Moreover, the proposed solutions in
this work can be extended to a scenario consisting more than two LUs, where
user pairing can be applied to construct a hybrid NOMA system [3].
2The situation where the two LUs have similar channel conditions makes
the benefits of implementing NOMA marginal, since the distinction in LUs’
channel conditions is crucial for NOMA to achieve significant performance gains
compared to conventional OMA [3].
is (M − 2), and holds that W†2W2 = diag[0; IM−2]. This
beamforming matrix ensures that AN lies in the null space of
Hm, and the reception quality of the LUs is not affected by
AN. Furthermore, the design of w1 is to artificially improve
the effective channel gain of LU1, such that w1 = h
†
1/||h1||.
Benefits of such construction include: 1) the effective channel
gains between the two LUs become distinct, creating an ideal
situation for implementing NOMA, and 2) the signal strength
for detection at the LUs maintains the same at the time of
transmission at the BS, which is beneficial for the SIC processing
to distinguish the individual information-bearing signal.
The M × 1 transmitted signal vector at the BS is
x = w1(α1s1 + α2s2) +W2v, (1)
where s1 and s2 denote the information-bearing signals intended
for LU1 and LU2 with E[||s1||] = E[||s2||] = 0 and E[||s1||2] =
E[||s2||2] = σ2s , α1 and α2 denote the power allocation coeffi-
cients satisfying α21+α
2
2 = 1, and v is an (M−2)×1 AN vector.
In particular, the BS chooses elements of v to be i.i.d. complex
Gaussian random variables with mean being zero and variance
being σ2v , and independent in different fading blocks as well.
We consider an aggragrate power constraint PT , and denote φ as
the power sharing factor between the information-bearing signals
and AN, such that σ2s = φPT and σ
2
v = (1 − φ)PT /(M − 2)
with 0 < φ < 1.
Based on the proposed SBF scheme, the received signals at
LUk for k = 1, 2 are given by
yk = hkw1(α1s1 + α2s2) + nk, (2)
where nk denotes the AWGN at LUk. Since the proposed
beamforming vector w1 improves the effective channel gain of
h1, the power allocation coefficients should satisfy α2 > α1 in
consideration of user fairness [5]. Then, SIC will be carried out
at LU1 following the decoding order s2 → s1. As such, the






where ρb = P/σ2b is called the transmit signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR). Conditioned on s2 being correctly decoded, LU1 first
subtracts s2 and then tries to recover its own signal s1 by










Simultaneously, Eve tries to extract s1 and s2 from its observa-
tions for the eavesdropping purpose. The received signal vector
at Eve can be expressed as
ye = Hew1(α1s1 + α2s2) +HeW2v + ne, (6)
where ne denotes the N ×1 AWGN vector at Eve. To guarantee
secure NOMA communications, it is reasonable to consider a
worst-case eavesdropping scenario, where 1) Eve is capable of
strong multiuser detection techniques [5], [12], e.g., subtract-
ing the inter-user interference generated by the superimposed
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information-bearing signals from each other, thus the individual
signal will be distinguishable at Eve, and 2) the AWGN vector
at Eve is arbitrarily small [11]. As a result, the received signal-
to-interference ratio (SIR) at Eve to decode sk for k = 1, 2 is
γe,sk =
α2k(M − 2)













Although the expression of (7) indeed overestimates Eve’s in-
terception capability, in the following, we will demonstrate that
the proposed SBF scheme can achieve a robust approach against
the worst-case eavesdropping in the considered MISO-NOMA
systems.
The secrecy capacity is defined as the non-negative capacity
difference between the main channel and the Eve’s channel.
Therefore, based on (3)–(7) and the imperfect worst-case SIC,









, if γ1,s2 ≥ γth,s2
0, otherwise
(8)
where [x]+ = max{x, 0}, γth,s2 = 2Rb,s2 − 1, and Rb,s2 denotes
the codeword rate for s2. It is clear from (8) that the secrecy
capacity for LU1 becomes zero if it fails to decode the signal
s2. This is reasonable in the sense that error propagation occurs
when SIC fails, corresponding to the imperfect worst-case SIC.
Such a characteristic is unique in NOMA systems, which needs
to be appropriately incorporated into the design and analysis of
secure NOMA communications.
In addition, the secrecy capacity for LU2 is obtained as
Csec,s2 =
[
log2(1 + γ2,s2)− log2(1 + γe,s2)
]+
. (9)
III. ANALYSIS OF SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY AND
SECRECY DIVERSITY ORDER
This section presents a comprehensive performance analysis
achieved by the proposed SBF scheme in terms of SOP and
secrecy diversity order, which are useful for practical setup.
A. Analysis of SOP
1) SOP for LU1: Based on total probability theorem, the SOP
for LU1 can be mathematically formulated as
Psop,1 = Pr
(
Csec,s1 < Rs,s1 |γ1,s2 ≥ γth,s2
)
× Pr (γ1,s2 ≥ γth,s2)+ Pr (γ1,s2 < γth,s2)
× Pr (Csec,s1 < Rs,s1 |γ1,s2 < γth,s2), (10)
where the first and second products on the right-hand side of
(10) are the probabilities that the secrecy capacity is below the
target secrecy rate Rs,s1 conditioned on whether signal s2 can
be decoded or not. Since the secrecy capacity is always equal to
zero if LU1 fails to decode s2, e.g., γ1,s2 < γth,s2 , which leads
to a secrecy outage for sure, and thus, we obtain the probability
Pr(Csec,s1 < Rs,s1 |γ1,s2 < γth,s2) = 1. Then, the probability


















, and the second equality is derived from
multiplying both sides in Pr(·) of the first equation by α21. From
(11), the power allocation α22 > α
2
1γth,s2 should be satisfied in
application of NOMA, because otherwise the SOP for LU1 is
always equal to one [5]. Combining the results in (8) and (11),
we can rewrite (10) as
Psop,1 = Pr
(







where ζ2(γe,s1) = 2
Rs,s1 (1 + γe,s1)− 1. A non-zero probability
Pr(ζ1 ≤ γ1,s1 < ζ2(γe,s1)) exists if and only if ζ2(γe,s1) ≥ ζ1,






To proceed forward, we denote X = γ1,s1 and Y1 = γe,s1 ,
and their statistics are shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 1: The cumulative density functions (CDFs) of X and
Y are computed, respectively, by






















where θ1 = 1φα21 and η =
1−φ
M−2 .
Proof: See Appendix A.1.
Using the results in Lemma 1, the SOP for LU1 is addressed
in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The SOP for LU1 is computed by (15), shown at
the top of the next page, where A11 and A12 can be found in
Appendix A.2.
Proof: See Appendix A.2.









Rs,s2 (1 + γe,s2)− 1
)
, (16)
where Rs,s2 denotes the target secrecy rate of LU2. For brevity,
we denote Y2 = γe,s2 and Z = γ2,s2 . The CDF of Y2 can be
obtained by following the same rationale with (14), and the CDF
of Z is characterized in the following lemma.
Lemma 2: The CDF of Z is obtained as







where κ = α22/α
2
1, and δ(·) denotes the unit step function.
Proof: See Appendix B.1.
Theorem 2: The SOP for LU2 can be numerically approxi-
mated as
Psop,2 ≈ 1− χ3(m)B11 + χ4(m)B12, (18)















m−1. In addition, B11 and B12 can be
found in Appendix B.2.
Proof: See Appendix B.2.
Remark 1: We highlight the fact that our new closed-form
expressions of (15) and (18) are easy to compute, due to
their simple forms which consist of power functions, fractional
functions, exponential functions, and trigonometric functions.
These results provide an efficient method for system designers to
characterize the secrecy performance in practical MISO-NOMA
systems without carrying out extensive Monte Carlo simulations.
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B. Analysis of Secrecy Diversity Order
Although the SOP expressions shown in (15) and (18) can be
used to evaluate the secrecy performance of the proposed SBF
scheme, they fail to provide intuitive insights. To this end, we
carry out the secrecy diversity analysis. As defined in [5], the
secrecy diversity order is achieved when the transmit SNR is
sufficiently high, e.g., ρb → ∞. The secrecy diversity order at
LUk for k = 1, 2 is defined as





where P∞sop,k denotes the asymptotic SOP for LUk.
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where Ξ∞1 (τ) and Ξ
∞
2 (τ) can be obtained by substituting ρb →
∞ into (35) and (36), shown in Appendix A.2.











ρb→∞' δ(κ− z) + δ(κ− z)θ1z
ρb(κ− z) . (27)
Using results of (26) and (27), and applying the similar proce-
dures in Appendices A.2 and B.2, Corollary 1 can be proved
straightforwardly.
Remark 2: Substituting results of (20) and (21) into (19), it
is straightforward that a secrecy diversity order Dsec,1 = M is
obtained at LU1. While a secrecy diversity order Dsec,2 = 1 is
achieved at LU2, due to the fact that the beamforming vector w1






Fig. 1. The variation of SOP as a function of ρb with M = 3 and N = 2.
shrinks the effective channel gain between BS and LU2 from a
1×M vector to a scalar. This secrecy diversity loss is sacrificed
for creating the channel difference between the two LUs, which
is beneficial for guaranteeing secure NOMA communications.
IV. NUMERICAL STUDIES
In this section, the secrecy performance of the proposed SBF
scheme is evaluated by using Monte Carlo simulations. For
illustration purpose, the codeword rates of the two LUs are set as
Rb,s1 = 1 bps/Hz and Rb,s2 = 0.5 bps/Hz, and the target secrecy
rates are set as Rs,s1 = 0.6 bps/Hz and Rs,s2 = 0.1 bps/Hz. The
power allocation coefficients used are α1 = 0.3 and α2 = 0.7,
respectively. The Gauss-Chebyshev node is chosen as L = 20 to
yield a close approximation.
Fig. 1 shows the SOP versus ρb achieved by the proposed
SBF scheme, where a close agreement between the simulated
and analytical results can be observed, and the asymptotic curves
become very tight in high ρb regime. For a comparison, the SOP
achieved by the benchmark scheme [5] is also plotted. From this
figure, we have the following informative observations:
• The proposed SBF scheme achieves a lower SOP than the
benchmark scheme [5] for LU1, where the SOP remains
very close to one. The reasons are twofold. First, the
beamforming vector for LU2 inevitably causes additional
AN to the range space of LU1, which leads to the SOP
approaching to a constant in medium to high ρb regime. Sec-
ond, the beamforming vector for LU1 exclusively enhances
the power strength of its intended signal, while limiting
the power strength of LU2’s signal. This may result in an
unsuccessful SIC processing at LU1 with a high probability.
Furthermore, our proposed SBF scheme outperforms the
benchmark scheme for LU2 in high ρb regime, because a
SOP floor occurs in [5].
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Fig. 2. The variation of SOP as a function of ρb with φ = 0.8.
• For the proposed SBF scheme, the SOP of LU1 decreases
faster than that of LU2, e.g., a secrecy diversity order of M
is achieved at LU1 while a secrecy diversity order of one is
obtained at LU2. This is consistent with Corollary 1, in the
sense that the propose SBF scheme not only intentionally
decreases the capability for Eve, but also effectively creates
channel difference for the two LUs, thus ensuring a robust
secure MISO-NOMA transmission.
• The power sharing factor φ has different impacts on the
two LUs. For LU1, a better SOP is achieved with a large
value of φ (e.g., φ = 0.8) in low to medium ρb regime, but
with a small value of φ (e.g., φ = 0.2) in medium to high
ρb regime. For LU2, a better SOP is always obtained with
a small value of φ. This indicates that in low to medium
ρb regime, there exists an optimal power sharing factor φ,
which balances the SOP of the two LUs. Therefore, it is of
salient significance to select the appropriate φ for the SOP
improvement.
Fig. 2 depicts the SOP versus ρb in the system with different
number of antennas. A general trend is that the SOP for LU1
significantly decreases with an increase in M due to a secrecy
diversity order of M , e.g., a full secrecy diversity order, is
achieved at LU1. By contrast, the SOP for LU2 decreases slightly
with the increased M , though the secrecy diversity order at LU2
is one. This is because the degree of freedom for generating
AN is enhanced with a large value of M . Therefore, increasing
the transmit antenna at the BS is an efficient yet simple method
to improve the secrecy performance of MISO-NOMA systems.
Furthermore, we find that an increase in N leads to an increase
in the SOP for both LUs, which shows the detrimental effect of
multiple receive antennas at Eve.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has investigated the problem of secure MISO-
NOMA transmission in the presence of a multiple-antenna Eve.
A new SBF scheme by exploiting AN has been proposed, where
AN is generated in the null space of the main channel, such that
only the Eve’s channel is degraded. Moreover, the developed
beamforming matrix artificially creates the difference for the two
LUs’ channel conditions, therefore fully realizing the potential of
NOMA. To evaluate the secrecy performance, we have derived
closed-form expressions for the SOP and the secrecy diversity
order. The results manifest that an improved secrecy performance
is achieved by the SBF scheme.
APPENDIX A
MATHEMATICAL PROOFS FOR LU1
A.1-Proof of Lemma 1: Observing γ1,s1 from (4), we find
that X follows a Gamma distribution with a shape parameter M
and a scale parameter ρbθ1 , which is due to the fact that ||h1||2
is the sum of the squares of M independent Gaussian random
variables. Therefore, an explicit expression for the CDF of X is
obtained in (13) straightforwardly.
Based on the construction of the beamforming matrix W,
we know that the entries of HeW are i.i.d. complex Gaussian
random variables, because the entries of He are i.i.d. complex
Gaussian random variables and W is a unitary matrix. This
indicates the fact that the elements of Hew1 and HeW2 in
(7) are independent. Therefore, the quantity of (7) is equivalent
to the SIR of a N -branch MMSE diversity combiner with
(M −2) interferers. With the help of [11], and after the variable
substitution, the CDF of Y1 is computed by (14).
Hence, we complete the proof of Lemma 1.
A.2-Proof of Theorem 1: According to the properties of the
















From (14), by taking the first derivative with y1, we derive the






















































































However, it is rather challenging to derive the closed-form
expressions for A11 and A12, due to their complicated inte-
grals. To overcome this problem, we will use an efficient L-
node Gauss-Chebyshev quadrature [14, eq. (25.4.45)] to yield
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a close approximation. Specifically, by changing variable of

































where ul = cos( 2l−12L pi), L denotes the number of the

















m−1. Furthermore, Ξ1(τ) and
Ξ2(τ) are given by
Ξ1(τ) =





1 + θ1η($ + tan τ)
)M−3 , (35)
Ξ2(τ) =





($ + tan τ)
(
1 + θ1η($ + tan τ)
)M−2 . (36)
Substituting (33) and (34) into (30), an explicit expression for






Combining the aforementioned results, Theorem 1 is proved.
APPENDIX B
MATHEMATICAL PROOFS FOR LU2
B.1-Proof of Lemma 2: It is clear that h2 is independent of h1,
and we have h2 is independent of w1 (since w1 = h
†
1/||h1||).
Thus, ||h2w1||2 follows the exponential distribution. Using this









where (38) holds only if z < κ, otherwise, FZ(z) = 1. As a
result, we prove (17) in Lemma 2.
B.2-Proof of Theorem 2: Upon using results in Lemma 2, the



























ρb(κ−ζ3(y2)) fY2(y2)dy2︸ ︷︷ ︸
B1
, (39)
where ϕ(κ) = 2−Rs,s2 (κ + 1) − 1, and step (i) is obtained by
using the fact that FZ(z) = 1 when z < κ (corresponds to






















Substituting (40) into (39), B1 can be rewritten as
B1 = χ3(m)B11 − χ4(m)B12. (41)
Again, we apply the Gauss-Chebyshev quadrature to obtain the







































where ω(v) = ϕ(κ)(v+1)2 , and vl = cos(
2l−1
2L pi).
Substituting these results into (39), Theorem 2 is proved in a
straightforward manner.
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